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Introduction: Historic Point of Embarkation 
 
The southeast coastal province of China located across the strait from Taiwan, 
called Fujian, “has a centuries-old history of being a source of emigrants from China to 
destinations throughout the world.”  Emigrants traveled with the intention of seeking new 1
opportunity for work and a better life. With 23 provinces, 4 municipalities, and 5 
autonomous regions in China, there is often inquiry as to what makes Fujian so special. 
There is no question that this prominent coastal location was important to China’s 
economy as coastal trading cities. The government established special economic zones to 
grant Fujian and the nearby province, Guangdong, special powers in the export and 
import industries after the opening up of the regime under Deng Xiaoping. Aside from 
the progress of the open-market policy under Deng, there are many noneconomic internal 
motives that drove individuals to migrate from Fujian, specifically after 1978. Physical 
geography, familial networks, economic-based government reforms, and in some cases 
international motives, have influenced high rates of both legal and illegal immigrant 
outflow from Fujian. Since the early 1990’s, it is estimated that 95 percent of Chinese 
illegal aliens originate from the Fujian Province.  With the influx of Chinese culture 2
within the Fujian province, a third space is created that consists of two cultures birthing a 
new identity.  3
1Judith Banister, Christina Wu Harbaugh, and Ellen Jamison, ​Population and Migration 
Characteristics of Fujian Province, China​. Center for International Research, (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1993), p. 15.  
2 Banister, et al., ​Population and Migration Characteristics of Fujian Province, China.​ p. 15. 
3 For the purposes of this report, the term “Chinese” refers to individuals of purely Chinese ethnic 
origin living in any part of the world. 
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The Fujian province, with Fuzhou serving as the capital, has a specific topography 
consisting of mountainous terrain, accompanied by valleys and rivers. The coastal 
landform faces the island province of Taiwan and is composed of peninsulas and bays 
facing outward towards the East China Sea. This distinct location made Fujian a natural 
port region for the trade of goods and humans, both legal and illegal, due to the feasibility 
of traveling to cities beyond the borders of the mainland. The close proximity between 
Fujian and the South China Seas allowed for easy access for maritime trade, pioneering 
the importance of fishermen and traders. Though the strategic location potentially posed 
disheartening to some inland farmers, due to not ideal farming conditions, a majority of 
Fujianese individuals adapted and turned to cultivating drought-tolerant sweet potatoes, 
peanuts, and other crops often seen in Fujianese dishes today. This shift in the local 
economy, paired with the opening of the economy under Deng Xiaoping helped form the 
current Fujianese culture of occupying the space of trading, being merchants, and making 
a living abroad. 
 
The particular geographical environment of Fujian Province allowed individuals 
to generate strong familial blood networks that, in turn, influenced high rates of out 
migration. Often times, one can determine someone who originates from this southeast 
coastal region solely by their surname. For example, my original family name, ​Huang 
[黄]​, is a very common name among Fujianese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, mainland China, 
and America. From being isolated by mountains and ocean, the Fujianese in the rural 
areas have remained in the same region for generations, leading to long-term 
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reproduction and descendants honoring the same ancestors. This strong sense of family 
and clans have dominated the social scene in Fujian, valuing the presence of blood 
connections and blood ties as an internal motive to emigrate. The temple (Figure 1.1) in 
my family’s hometown in Fujian has a picture of my grandfather (Figure 1.2). Individuals 
relating their native places in Southern Fujian (Minnan), “considering the connections 
between the trade and migration involving Fujianese within China” often drifted towards 
close relatives, clans, folks, friends, or other forms of blood networks. Although 
immigrants are a common phenomenon in the history of Chinese social development, 
Fujian’s immigration history is particularly distinctive.  Due to economic incentives, 4
geographic location, and strong blood networks, Fujianese individuals were bred to 
migrate and establish their own paths throughout the diaspora. American writer and 
investigative journalist, Patrick Keefe, touches on this theme of “chain migration” in his 
novel, ​The Snakehead, ​ with regards to Fujianese migration where “the family was 
regarded as an economic unit, and the first pioneers to leave the village generally did so 
with the aim of establishing a beachhead on a foreign shore and eventually sending for 
the family.”  Through a combination of distinctive geographic location and traditional 5
devotion to familial ties, Fujian has become a global hub that produces the highest rates 
of out-migration in the world.  
4 Lucille Cha, ​The Butcher, the Baker, and the Carpenter: Sojouners in the Spanish Philippines 
and Their Impact on Southern Fujian​, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, 
2006, p. 510. 
5 Patrick R. Keefe, ​The Snakehead: An Epic Tale of the Chinatown Underworld and the American 
Dream​, (New York, 2009): p. 29.  
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The largest number of Fujian immigrants are Fuzhou people, particularly from 
Changle.  This trend was not uncommon throughout history, ranging as far back as “the 6
thirteenth century [when] Marco Polo visited the port of Fuzhou and remarked on the 
great quantities of its chief exports.”  Because Fujian is located in the southeast region of 7
China, far from the political and economic center, there is a spatial divide among the 
neighboring provinces. Being one of “China’s smaller provinces, [Fujian], a mountainous 
sliver of coast far from the official influence of Beijing and directly across the strait form 
Taiwan, has always been one of China’s most outward-looking regions, home to seafarers 
and traders, smugglers and explorers: a historic point of embarkation.”  Isolation from 8
mainland China paired with the enhanced exposure to the outside world as well as 
Fujian’s specific topography created a physical political divide that allowed the Fujianese 
to have such a distinctive experience. ​Fujian Province has become known as “the 
breeding ground for outward migration, secret societies, as well as for people traveling 
abroad.”  The post-Mao economic programs as well as the formation of special economic 9
zones have further emphasized coastal development in China.  The Chinese government, 10
under the reign of Deng Xiaoping, implemented the post-Mao reform and opening policy 
in 1978 where many individuals seized the opportunity to thrive abroad. From there, 
Fujian was established as a special economic zone and further blossomed to reach its 
6 Patrick R. Keefe, “Snakeheads and Smuggling: The Dynamics of Illegal Chinese Immigration,” 
World Policy Journal, ​Vol. 26, No. 1 (2009): p. 33.  
7 Ibid, p. 27 
8 Ibid, p. 27. 
9 Cindy Yik-yi Chu, “Human Trafficking and Smuggling in China,” ​Journal of Contemporary 
China,​ (2011): p. 44. 
10 ​Jennifer Bolz, “Chinese Organized Crime and Illegal Alien Trafficking: Humans as a 
Commodity.” ​Asian Affairs: An American Review​, vol. 22, no. 3, (1995): p 149. 
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potential as an economic threat. This new open market economy incentivized driven 
individuals not averse to migration to seize the opportunity of moving to another 
environment for work. As a result of these reforms in the 1980s, the Fujianese working 
male population adopted the title of being “temporary residents” wherever they traveled 
to.  These temporary residents, typically workers, students, or family members, further 11
contributed to the reputation of Fujianese high migration rates. Students from Fujian 
would travel elsewhere with the goal of “establishing a beachhead on foreign shore” to be 
a resource for their family to later migrate comfortably. This rising trend of expanding 
familial blood networks on a global scale, further strengthened the growing reputation 
that Fujian acquired of being a “hotbed of trafficking and smuggling in China… moving 
West both legally and illegally,” maintaining Fujian’s “commonly acknowledged 
emigration history, and this developing coastal province has a concentration of China’s 
‘human snakes’, namely trafficked and smuggled persons.”  The economic reforms and 12
changes in regulations gearing towards a market economy in China further influenced the 
large flow of Fujianese individuals in search of opportunity to work elsewhere. This trend 
encouraged individuals to utilize their network of illegal or legal practices, ranging from 
human trafficking or banking systems.  This time period of opening market reform 13
accompanied by the growing trends of out migration, led to the birth and widespread 
growth of the snakehead industry.  
 
11 Banister, ​Population and Migration Characteristics of Fujian Province, China​, p. 14. 
12 ​Chu, “Human Trafficking and Smuggling in China,” p. 43. 
13 ​Keefe, “Snakeheads and Smuggling,” p. 41. 
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Fujian’s commonly acknowledged emigration history can also be attributed to the 
social pressure of “going abroad, to earn money and send it back home, and then to 
become rich among Fujianese peers. There has been pressure from families and society to 
earn enough overseas, to return, and then to become bosses at home.”  This goes hand in 14
hand with the rising trend of students going abroad and having to extend their 
achievements to their families back home in Fujian. Although the high rates of out 
migration lead one to assume that there might be negative incentives involved urging 
individuals to want to leave Fujian, but the economy of this special economic zone at the 
time was not poor. “According to a 2000 ​Newsweek​ article, smuggled Fujianese were 
‘seldom poor and desperate’, but they simply followed the tradition of being ‘eager to get 
rich.’”  Typically, those who could afford to go abroad or send their children abroad to 15
study were the wealthier families that had long resided in Fujian. As a result, rapid 
development tended to bypass farmers and peasants, not reaping the direct benefits 
caused by the increase in maritime trade in Fujian. As the increasing inflation decreased 
their real incomes, a large amount of Chinese turned towards organized crime for a more 
stable income.  These hard working farmers and peasants applied their work ethic to 16
their occupations abroad. Throughout the Fujianese diaspora, migrants and workers 
earned the reputation of being hard working and economically driven. 
 
14 ​Chu, “Human Trafficking and Smuggling in China,” p. 44. 
15  ​Ibid,” p. 43. 
16 Bolz, “Chinese Organized Crime and Illegal Alien Trafficking,” p. 153.  
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The rising presence of Fujianese throughout the Chinese diaspora created a 
specific niche of driven individuals seeking opportunity elsewhere. Because of the 
change in laws and regulations during the mid-1980s under Deng Xiaoping, the rush of 
individuals yearning to go abroad ran high, specifically among students and workers. 
This new commodification of Fujianese overseas travelers to fill the void of students and 
workers allowed for the birth of a new identity throughout the diaspora. This specific 
niche created a new “third space,” a term coined by Homi Bhabha that describes the 
emerging gray area that these Fujianese travelers adopted, forming their hybridized 
identities overseas. This “third space” intersects and overlaps multiple spheres of cultural 
identity, combatting maintaining the authenticity of representing their home nation, while 
navigating a new culture. Edgar Wickberg argues “that immigration and settlement 
stimulate a need to redefine oneself and one’s family in ways that will adapt to the new 
environment yet be consistent with one’s values, if possible.”  Reiterating the strong 17
familial kinship tradition, those family members left behind in Fujian later set off to 
reunite with their blood networks who had fled to study or find work. Identifying as a 
student or as a worker were the requirements that led to exclusion of those who did not 
fall under the category, “there was a clear demand to leave by people who did not fit into 
either of those two categories. It was under these circumstances that ‘snake people’ or 
‘snakehead’ (​she tou​) smugglers began to emerge and the tidal wave of emigration began 
17 Edgar Wickberg, “Global Chinese Migrants and Performing Chineseness,” ​Journal of Chinese 
Overseas​, vol. 3, no. 2, (2007): p. 178. 
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to swell.”  This new formation of the “snakehead” as an untraditional occupation arose 18
from the emerging demand for Fujianese migrants around the world, whether that be 
legally or illegally. Tracing Deng Xiaoping’s legislation changes that sparkplugged a 
major wave of both legal and illegal emigration from China in the 1980’s allowed for the 
reputation of having the largest immigrant rates to be formed. This combination of 
economically driven individuals and crafty snakeheads resulted in “more than half of 
Asia’s forty billionaires of Chinese ancestry in the year 2000 ha[ving] roots in Fujian 
Province. What the Fujianese did best, it sometimes seems, was leave.”  As a result this 19
trend of out migration and assimilation into new cultures allowed for Fujianese migrants 
to progressively form new identities in foreign spheres. This thesis will be covering 
several topics regarding Fujianese immigration and approaches to the “third space,” 
ranging from the historical incentives during the 1980’s and birth of “snakeheads,” to the 
Fujianese migrants in the Philippines, and finally, the complex nature of transcultural 
hybridity that has resulted from globalization.  
 
In 1594,  one of the world’s first Chinatown establishments arose in the 20
Philippine capital, Manila, and marked the beginning of a new tradition of familial 
networks and native place associations which sprouted from working men who branched 
out to find work in foreign lands. Since this establishment of the Chinatown in the central 
18 Zai ​Liang, “Demography of Illicit Emigration from China: A Sending Country's Perspective.” 
Sociological Forum​, vol. 16, no. 4, (2001): p. 681. 
19 Keefe, “The Snakehead,” p. 29. 
20 Edgar ​Wickberg, "The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History." ​Journal of Southeast Asian 
History​ 5, no. 1 (1964), p. 70. 
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city of Binondo, located within metro-Manila, the Chinese have remained a longstanding 
minority in the Philippines and “coexisted with Filipinos throughout the colonial era of 
Spain, United States, and Japan.”  This historical relationship between the Chinese and 21
Filipinos has played an integral role in the formation of the Chinese-Filipino identity. 
Another facet that has contributed to the uniqueness of the Chinese-Filipino identity is 
the vast population of Fujianese in the Philippines. A large majority of Chinese 
immigrants that reside in the Philippines can trace their roots back to Fujian.  Tracing 22
back to “the 1570s, Fujianese merchants had established trading posts in Manila and 
Nagasaki. Seed communities of Fujianese traders were established throughout Southeast 
Asia, and today, centuries later, vast numbers of ethnic Fujianese are scattered throughout 
the region.”  This distinct formation of transcultural identity has encouraged various 23
forms of representation throughout the Fujianese diaspora. Many Chinese individuals 
have maintained their ethnic identity through means of their own, whether that be through 
maintaining traditions, retaining language, or returning back to their ancestral homes in 
China. For example, the first female president, “President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, 
whose great grandfather was an immigrant from the southeastern part of Fujian, China, 
visited her ancestral home in 1988.”  Her paternal great-grandfather, Co Yu Hwan, 24
converted to Catholicism after emigrating from Fujian and adopted the name Jose 
21 ​Uytanlet, Juliet Lee. ​The Hybrid Tsinoys: Challenges of Hybridity and Homogeneity as 
Sociocultural Constructs among the Chinese in the Philippines​. (Pickwick Publications, 2016): p. 
4. 
22 Richard Chu, ​The “Chinese” and the “Mestizos” of the Philippines: Towards a New 
Interpretation,​ Philippine Studies Vol 50, No. 3, (2002): 327. 
23 Keefe, “The Snakehead,” p. 27-28. 
24 Chu, ​The “Chinese” and the “Mestizos” of the Philippines, p. 327. 
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Cojuangco.  As a prominent political figure, President Aquino embraced her Fujianese 25
heritage and instilled nationalistic attitudes inspiring pride in identifying as 
Chinese-Filipino in the Philippines. Similar to my own family’s background, President 
Aquino and many other mixed Chinese-Filipino individuals have approached the task of 
forming a unique in-between identity that neither confines nor defines them.  
  
Similar to President Aquino’s background, my family came across the Filipino 
surname, Cotangco, in an unconventional way, leaving behind the Chinese surname, 
Huang​. Many Chinese-Filipino individuals share a similar experience, not only having to 
assimilate culturally, but also physically adapting their surnames to better fit in. 
Occurring after China’s transition to a market economy in the 1980s, which resulted from 
a widespread embrace of globalization and increasing waves of immigration from Fujian, 
the Chinese-Filipino identity has vastly undergone changes. This particular topic of 
research regarding identity and cultural formation is of relevance to me because along 
with understanding my own culture’s unique historic background, I’m also able to trace 
my own “third space” as a form of hybridity. Through researching my own familial 
history, I have been able to discover the hybridity that forms the nuances of my personal 
cultural identity (straddling the line between Chinese-Filipino and American culture and 
identity). Because my paternal grandfather emigrated from Fujian to the Philippines, 
living part-time with his Fujianese wife and children and splitting time with his Filipino 
25 David Wurfel, “Elites of Wealth and Elites of Power. The Changing Dynamic: A Philippine 
Case Study,” ​Southeast Asian Affairs,​ (1979): 235. 
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wife and children. He made sure to indulge my father and his six other siblings in the 
Philippines with Chinese culture, enrolling each child in a Chinese Christian schools. 
This religious assimilation allowed the transition for my grandfather and many other 
Chinese Filipino immigrants from Fujian to assimilate smoothly into a new culture. To 
illustrate the many changes in identity formation, and the navigation of new cultural 
spaces, I will incorporate interviews I’ve conducted with family members who share their 
Chinese-Filipino experiences throughout the diaspora. In these conversations, we discuss 
their relationship with cultural hybridity, identifying as Chinese-Filipino, and the “third 
space.”  
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Chapter 1: Snakeheads as Facilitators 
 
When discussing Fujian migration, in both legal and illegal terms, it is important 
to acknowledge the intricate network of collaboration involved. Stemming from an 
integral and ancient social practice in China, ​guanxi​, or personal connection, extends to 
all levels of society, particularly in the business sector.   This phenomenon, specific to 26
Chinese traditional culture is “an indigenous Chinese construct and [is] define[d] as an 
informal particularistic personal connection between two individuals bound by an 
implicit psychological contract to follow the social norm of ​guanxi​ such as maintaining a 
long-term relationship, mutual commitment, loyalty, and obligation.”  In other words, 27
the practice of cultivating a ​guanxi ​network is a dynamic process of mutual reciprocity 
that has played an essential role in achieving social mobility in Chinese society. Forming 
one’s own ​guanxi​ network places value on the system of essential connections required to 
succeed in the “ancient Chinese social system and its political and moral philosophy.”  28
In practice, government officials utilize their ​guanxi​ network, relying on being 
well-connected to higher ranked officials in order to gain promotion.  Although the 29
deeply embedded concept of ​guanxi ​has been ingrained into Chinese society since the 
Chinese social philosophy of Confucianism, it is important to distinguish these informal 
26 Xiao-Ping Chen and Chao C. Chen, “On the Intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi: A Process 
Model of Guanxi Development,” ​Asia Pacific Journal of Management,​ (2004), Vol 21, Issue 3, p. 
305. 
27 Ibid., p. 306 
28 Ibid., p. 307. 
29 Sebastian Heilmann, “Governing China’s Economy,” ​China’s Political System​, (Rowman & 
Littlefield: 2017), p 233.  
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relationships from corruption.  Maintaining one’s ​guanxi​ directly corresponds with the 30
widespread increase of government corruption in China. Albeit a sensitive topic, this 
top-down corruption and incorporation of these complex networks correspond with the 
collaborative efforts involving snakeheads.   31
 
Originating in the 1970’s, snakeheads went into business charging fees to 
customers via ferry to travel from Changle or Fuzhou, two major cities in the Fujian 
Province.”  Snakeheads are defined as the Chinese individuals, predominantly 32
originating from Fujian, that assist in the process of smuggling individuals to other 
countries. Clients of snakeheads aimed to migrate from Fujian and extend the diaspora 
globally, further opening up the market for the snakehead business to prosper. According 
to Patrick Radden Keefe, international labour migrants, also known as Overseas Chinese, 
represent the second largest diaspora on the planet, after the descendants of African 
slaves.  These labour migrants or Overseas Chinese were perceived through a mixed 33
lens. Labour migrants were either seen as positive business assets, typically because they 
were crafty and driven individuals willing to work, or viewed negatively, impacting and 
contributing to the decline of local host economies. As the global demand for 
international labour migrants increased, the snakehead business continued to grow 
30 Xiangru Yin, “An Analysis of Corruption in China: The Guanxi Network of Chinese High 
Level Officials and Governors,” (2017), ​International Development, Community, and 
Environment (IDCE).​ 6. 
31 Patrick Radden Keefe, “Snakeheads and Smuggling: The Dynamics of Illegal Chinese 
Immigration,” ​World Policy Journal,​ (2009), p. 41. 
32 Ibid., p. 35. 
33 Ibid., p. 34. 
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accordingly. These snakeheads were linked to an complicated process of professional 
smuggling involving Overseas Chinese on various levels. Some scholars view these 
individuals as illegal criminals, while others see them as “resourceful individuals, 
enterprising tour-guides, or nomadic figures.”  Sheldon Zhang and Ko-lin Chin (2003) 34
conducted a cross-national study providing a factual stance on the complexities regarding 
the nature of the snakehead individuals. Uncovering the complicated process required to 
carry out the smuggling of individuals, Zhang and Chin take an optimistic approach 
towards the snakehead business, viewing these snakeheads as pawns in a larger business 
scheme that plays a part in an overall corrupt system. Through conducting face-to-face 
interviews, Zhang and Chin paint snakeheads in a civilized manner, alluding to the profit 
bearing aspect and profitability that the unique occupation provides around the world.  35
On the other hand, ​Cindy Yik-yi Chu clarifies the distinction between human smuggling 
and human trafficking, because she believes that both modes of migration are “serious 
problems which have proven difficult to resolve.”  She raises the important question of 36
whether snakeheads and organized crime groups are advantageous or disadvantageous to 
the local economies. Chu contrasts Zhang and Chin’s perspective that snakeheads are 
particularly crafty and driven individuals, by referring to them as a global problem, 
detrimental to the local economies. However, Chu also introduces criticism towards the 
34 Ibid., p. 34. 
35  Sheldon Zhang and Ko-lin Chin, “Characteristics of Chinese Human Smugglers: A 
Cross-National Study.” San Diego State: 2003, p. 1. 
36  Cindy Yik-yi Chu, “Human Trafficking and Smuggling in China,” ​Journal of Contemporary 
China,​ 2011, p. 39. 
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corrupt governing system that involves and allows this illegal smuggling to occur and 
believes that the transnational criminal offenses and manipulation of human rights should 
be addressed on a global scale. The research conducted by these authors provide relevant 
insight to the polar position that snakeheads occupy in the rapid process of globalization. 
 
Jennifer Bolz, a transnational trafficking expert, takes into consideration the 
stance that the government legislation has on these complex smuggling organizations, 
further questioning the validity and accountability of the corrupt systems within Chinese 
government. The systematic corruption is further analyzed by questioning who is to 
blame for the sudden rise in illegal Chinese immigration that has sparkplugged and 
become a phenomenon affecting the global economy. ​In comparison, ​Glenn Curtis and 
his colleagues (Glenn E. Curtis, LaVerle B. Berry, Seth L. Elan, Rexford A. Hudson, 
Nina A. Kollars, 2003) further dissect the transnational activities of ethnic Chinese 
criminal groups and organizations, specifically investigating individuals in snakehead 
groups who have assisted these illegal Chinese migrants. The purpose in bringing these 
authors, scholars, and researchers into my discussion is to compare the conflicting 
perspectives that address the complex field of human smuggling. Through analysis of 
various discussions regarding snakeheads and migration, albeit legal or illegal, this 
section hints at the emerging effects of transcultural integration and intermingling 
throughout the Fujianese diaspora.  
 
Human Smuggling: Business is Business 
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Sheldon Zhang and Ko-lin Chin (2003) provide an extensive study uncovering the 
inner workings of Chinese human smuggling organizations and their operations. By 
interviewing individuals in both the U.S. and China, their researcher concluded that 
human smugglers, commonly known as snakeheads, “have been able to develop 
extensive global networks and transport Chinese nationals to various parts of the world.”
 Zhang and Chin recognize the complex process that requires multiple phases of 37
involvement at the potential risk of imprisonment. Their study outlines the methodology 
“snakeheads” use through three main areas: the utilization of U.S. bordering countries 
such as Mexico or Canada, flying to the U.S. and gaining access through the transit 
points, and traveling via boat using fishing trawlers or freighters.  These difficult 38
journeys involve multiple stages and various members to comply and participate in the 
human smuggling operations. Zhang and Chin conclude that there are several highly 
specialized roles involved in the smuggling process. This process includes: recruiters, 
coordinators, transporters, document vendors, corrupt public officials, guides and crew 
members, enforcers, and debt collectors.  Zhang and Chin dedicate a significant portion 39
of their study to analyzing the outcome of attitudes that the general public has regarding 
snakeheads. Typically, the result tended to be positive due to the fact that snakeheads 
“saw themselves as upstanding businesspeople or even do-gooders who helped their 
friends and neighbors in their search for a better life.”  This approach to the social work 40
37 Sheldon Zhang and Ko-lin Chin, “Characteristics of Chinese Human Smugglers,” San Diego 
State: 2003, p. 1. 
38 Ibid., p. 2. 
39 Ibid., p 16. 
40 Ibid., p. 18. 
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that snakeheads fulfill has a more optimistic approach towards this form of organized 
crime and human smuggling. Although the outcome does not result in direct harm 
towards other individuals or the economy, some snakeheads perceived their work of 
transporting human cargo elsewhere as a solution to solving China’s various social 
problems (i.e. overpopulation and unemployment).  Although these individuals put their 41
livelihood at risk, “neither the migrant party nor the smugglers directly considered 
transnational human smuggling to be a crime and that they would rather view it as a 
‘good deed.’”  Of those involved in the smuggling process, corrupt public officials and 42
other law enforcement authorities must not be discounted. This approach to the broader 
implications that come along with the snakehead business of human smuggling, raises the 
question of morality with regards to whether the government funded roles involved in the 
smuggling process were aware of the systematic corruption they were contributing to. 
Corrupt government involvement insinuates and encourages the acceptance of human 
trade among the “law-abiding people, including reputed businesspeople and community 
leaders,” that occupy a majority of Chinese society.  Snakeheads and other individuals 43
involved in the smuggling process undoubtedly influence various levels of Chinese 
society. Similar to the complex practice of cultivating one’s own ​guanxi ​network, the role 
of snakeheads in contributing to Chinese society allows for potential discussion in the 
controversial topic of systematic corruption. 
 
41 Ibid., p. 19.  
42 Ibid., p. 19.  
43 Ibid., p. 19.  
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Who’s to Blame: Globalization or Government? 
Continuing the analysis provided by Zhang and Chin (2003) that Chinese 
snakehead business exposes government corruption and bribery that coincides with the 
process of human smuggling, history professor at Hong Kong Baptist University, Cindy 
Yik-yi Chu (2011) examines the cause(s), nature, and impact of the global problems 
regarding the practice of human trafficking and smuggling in China. In her analysis of 
transnational crime, Chu clarifies the distinction between human smuggling and human 
trafficking. Although the positive perspective is voluntary, both smuggling and 
trafficking contribute to the illegal migration patterns from Fujian. The definitive barrier 
between the positive and negative perspectives towards snakeheads allows for further 
analysis. This gray area concerns various factors of influence involved, whether that be 
government mediation or societal indifference towards the matter of human transfer. In 
relation to the snakehead network, Chu further details the large amount of risk that 
individuals take on when involved with human smuggling from China and the effect that 
this newly commodified field of work involving snakeheads has on the economy. She 
identifies the global nature that comes hand in hand with the snakehead organizations. 
Representing the various avenues of connectivity that comes along with transnational 
migration and human trading, Chu mentions that “with globalization, the snakehead 
networks have become increasingly complicated and the smuggling routes have been 
hard to trace, together facilitating this human trade.”  The complex role of the snakehead 44
bridges the gap between cultures, further strengthening the relationships between the host 
44 Chu, “Human Trafficking and Smuggling in China,” p. 43. 
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countries and these Fujianese migrants in search for opportunity elsewhere. Though often 
times controversial, the role that the snakehead individuals take on as facilitators for 
cultural preservation is important to acknowledge in the migration process.  
 
Chu frames the work of snakeheads as a problem addressed by the Chinese 
government in 2002.  Chu mentions that “smuggled people have contributed to labor in 45
the black market, and this has led to the reduction of the general income of residents of 
destination countries. At the same time, trafficking has involved kidnapping and 
exploitation… Making matters worse, trafficking has led to a rise in crime in destination 
places.”  This shift in perspectives raises an interesting point of view towards smuggled 46
individuals as parasitic to the host country, negatively affecting the global economy 
through black market labor. Chu concludes her article by directing the responsibility to 
the local and global governing systems in power. Emphasizing the transnational 
connections required of the snakehead individuals, Chu points towards “international 
cooperation [to] effectively facilitate the arrest and prosecution of the snakeheads, and 
the tracing of the trafficking and smuggling gangs.”  She casts the blame upon “the 47
central government [who] will need to increase the penalty for such offenses and to 
educate the public on the terrible consequences of these ever-growing trafficking and 
smuggling crimes, the results of which have been forced labor, sex trade, illegal adoption 
of children, deaths during trips, a lack of concern for human rights, an expanding 
45 Ibid., p. 49. 
46 Ibid., p. 43.  
47 Ibid., p. 52. 
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smuggling network, and so on.”  Chu’s positionality of the negative repercussions 48
towards the global economy as well as the governing systems shows the high risk that 
this lifestyle of human smuggling brings about.  
 
Holding the government legislation accountable for the health and safety of their 
host regions, Chu raises an interesting question that Jennifer Bolz also seeks to expand 
on. Bolz dissects the tragedy that occurred in the early 90s, where a Panamanian vessel, 
the ​Golden Venture​, hosting 300 individuals of human freight had crashed, and as a 
result, 175 of these illegal immigrants were sent to jail.  Tangentially, Bolz questions the 49
accountability of the larger, global, issue of human smuggling by asking: ​“Why do 
thousands of Chinese risk death, deportation, and potential indentured servitude in order 
to reach a foreign country whose citizens are becoming more and more unsympathetic to 
the plight of illegal aliens?”  She expands on the growing network of the triad societies 50
and how these societies have developed as dominant in controlling international 
smuggling. She adopts the stance that these “Chinese crime groups have become an 
international threat,” further exposing the government links to organized crime societies.
 Bolz emphasizes the global collaboration necessary to combat the “international threat” 51
of smuggling. She concludes that the solution to combating the trend of illegal alien 
48 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
49 Jennifer Bolz, “Chinese Organized Crime and Illegal Alien Trafficking: Humans as a 
Commodity,” ​Asian Affairs​, 22, no. 3 (Fall 1995), p 154. 
50 Ibid., p. 150. 
51 Ibid., p. 150. 
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trafficking is to hold the government systems accountable and encourage growth in the 
economic development of China.  
 
Curtis and his colleagues (Curtis et. al, 2003) introduce triads, as a “form of secret 
society that first appeared in the seventeenth century in southern China in opposition to 
emperors of the Qing Dynasty.”  These early forms of organized crime syndicates paved 52
the way for snakeheads to arise. Curtis clarifies that not all organized Chinese crime 
groups are attributed to the triad model, though the triad-like rituals and structures are 
similar in the process of smuggling individuals from China.  Although Curtis adopts the 53
stance that these criminal groups constitute a threat to the societies in which they assume, 
the large support system involved in harboring illegal migrants is “efficient in creating 
loose, flexible multinational structures that are often linked with legitimate business and 
enterprises; exploiting weaknesses in the law enforcement systems of individual 
countries.”  Similar to Zhang and Chin’s approach regarding the advantages that the 54
snakeheads provide towards solving China’s social problems, Curtis argues that although 
these triad-like crime organizations sprouted from a field of illegal potential threats to 
society, they often include the involvement, and promotion of, legal businesses. Curtis 
acknowledges that Ko-lin Chin (Zhang, 2002) clarifies that “the term ‘organized crime’ 
may not apply strictly to what is nevertheless a very large and growing form of criminal 
52 Glenn Curtis, et al. “Transnational Activities of Chinese Crime Organizations.” ​Trends in 
Organized Crime, ​vol. 7, no. 3, (2002): p. 3. 
53 Ibid., p. 3.  
54 Ibid., p. 47.  
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activity. It is certain that individuals at the transit points are Taiwanese, Chinese, and 
non-Chinese, although the initiators of this global business are specifically Fujian 
Chinese in the United States.”  Curtis uses this fact to strengthen his more neutral 55
approach that organized crime is vaguely defined and varies in different circumstances, 
focusing more in depth on the differing levels of snakehead operations. He makes the 
distinction between snakeheads, which largely focuses on illegal human smuggling, and 
triads and gangs, which “are also involved in recruiting and smuggling of women for the 
sex trade in the United States and in running brothels in Chinese communities.”  He 56
clarifies that Chinese triads are largely active in the raw materials trade business, often 
transporting more than just humans, while snakeheads focus their efforts on individuals 
interested in migration. The negative connotation associated with “illegal” or 
“smuggling” creates a distinction that defines the varying positionality with regards to 
these “organized crime groups.” Although there is some overlap between the historical 
origin of triads and snakehead organizations, the distinction must be made regarding the 
perspective of this illegal occupation that is in such high demand, particularly in Fujian.  
 
With this in mind, migrants who choose to employ this method of transcultural 
smuggling submit to valuing and retaining the authenticity of their Chinese culture, rather 
than directly adhering to assimilation and conformity. Although there are mixed 
perspectives regarding the snakehead industry and their role in hybrid cultural formation, 
55  Ibid., p. 28. 
56  Ibid., p. 29. 
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the multiple components revert the blame to a systematically corrupt governing structure. 
Through an understanding of varying snakehead perspectives regarding organized crime 
networks, we come to better understand the nature of globalization and intercultural 
influences on a transnational sphere. The rise in demand of Chinese workers as a global 
commodity puts governing systems in a difficult supporting position. Governments are 
stuck between the blurred lines of legal and illegal migration, and the birth of the 
snakehead as an occupation has formed the potential propagation of new identities 
throughout the Fujianese diaspora. ​Snakeheads strategically utilize their ambiguous 
position in society to further contribute to hybrid formation of Chinese identities 
throughout the diaspora in a global setting.  
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Chapter 2: Chinese-Filipino Hybrid Identity 
As I walked through the bustling streets of Ongpin in the heart of Binondo, my 
aunt pointed out the familiar restaurants and markets she frequented during her 
childhood. Walking north of the Pasig River, we passed the fountain which stands 
profoundly at the entrance of the Plaza San Lorenzo Ruiz which was later renamed for 
Governor-General Gomez Pérez Dasmariñas, the Dominican friar who contributed to the 
creation of Binondo Church in the 16th century.  Visiting the site, I remember being in 57
awe of the religious monument, one of the first and main churches in Manila.  Stepping 58
back to properly examine the faded and dusty concrete bricks of the building, I noted the 
surroundings: an interesting mix of pushy tourists, the darkened feet of homeless 
Filipinos poking out from under umbrellas, Chinese shops decorated to excess with red 
lanterns, and crowds of schoolchildren rushing and playing across the streets. This area, 
specifically, was a culmination of years of maritime trade history, Spanish colonization, 
and cultural intermingling due to Western hegemony and globalization representative of 
the not-so homogenous attitudes among the Chinese in the Philippines. This 
thought-provoking space, now occupied by a multitude of individuals with varying 
backgrounds, allowed for the formation of a “third space” as a result of the hybridized 
cultures coming together. New forms of distinctions have arisen through this clash of 
civilizations. The term Sangley, or Chinese mestizo, for example, is separate from the 
57 Enrique Soriano, “Binondo: The Oldest Chinatown,” ​Inquirer Business Binondo the Oldest 
Chinatown, ​Philippine Daily Inquirer,​ February 11, 2017​, Accessed March 18, 2019, 
https://business.inquirer.net/224378/binondo-oldest-chinatown​. 
58 Ibid. 
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Spanish mestizo, but implies the same social changes that occurred in the Philippines.  59
The socio-cultural nuances adopted by Filipino-Chinese formed an identity that was not 
only fluid, but also very ambiguous. In this way, this flexible identity allows for a 
multitude of interpretations that challenge the duality of what it means to be 
“Chinese-Filipino,” rather embracing the multilayered aspects of the characteristics and 
categories of what it means to identify as a “Catholic,” “mestizo,” “Tagalog Filipino,” 
“Inchik,” “Tsinoy,” or “Chinese” in the Philippines. In addressing the varying categories 
contributing to what it means to identify as Chinese-Filipino, I was able to contextualize 
my unique experience as a cultural hybrid. 
 
In collaboration with extensive interviews with family members, this chapter will 
analyze the impact that Fujianese trade and migration to the Spanish Philippines had on 
the current  identity of current Chinese-Filipinos throughout the diaspora. Due recent 60
time spent in the Philippines, I was able to gain a better understanding of my family’s 
experience and upbringing as Chinese-Filipino individuals, and their navigation of life as 
Chinese-Filipinos in the Philippines. Although I was never able to meet my grandfather, 
the founder of the “Cotangco” family presence in Manila, I came to gain an appreciation 
for his business ventures and decision making resulting from the extensive legacy he left 
behind for his seven children in the Philippines as well as two sons in Fujian. Hearing 
only respectful and positive attributes associated with my grandfather, I felt as though I 
59 Edgar Wickberg, “The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History,” ​Journal of Southeast Asian 
History,​ Vol. 5, No.  1 (Cambridge University Press, 1964), 62.  
60 Current, for the purposes of this paper, pertains to the last fifty years. 
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had an accurate glimpse into his life, albeit his passing away before I was born. He was 
able to build a foundation for the entire Cotangco extended family, as a way of living 
comfortably, by craftily obtaining a rice mill, shoe business, and multiple buildings 
throughout metro Manila. In sum, my grandfather was able to successfully cultivate his 
guanxi​, “translated into English as ‘connections’ or ‘relationships.’”  By navigating the 61
new cultures and spheres in the Philippines, he was able to spread motivations of growth 
and independence from his upbringing in Fujian. My grandfather’s experience 
maneuvering a new locale while maintaining his Fujianese roots, and then transferring 
these notions of preserving the core of his familial values and beliefs, identifies one of the 
routes towards the “third space” that the Chinese-Filipino encompasses.  
 
My father, Edilberto, is the second youngest of seven siblings, and was the first to 
immigrate to America in search of better opportunity. All of the seven Cotangco siblings 
had varying experiences growing up, considering that they each attended different 
schools and had different friend groups that they associated with. A prime example of the 
various routes that the “third space” comprises of, varying from my father’s experience to 
that of his siblings. The oldest of the seven siblings, Juanito or John Cotangco, attended 
Crusaders-Lorenzo Ruiz Academy, a Filipino-Chinese Catholic school on Ongpin Street 
in Binondo. Still fluent in Hokkien, the Fujianese language that was taught at 
Crusaders-Lorenzo Ruiz Academy, he went on to open up his own fried chicken 
61 Pierre Ostrowski and Gwen Penner. “Chapter 5  ‘Guanxi’ and ‘Mianzi.’” ​It’s All Chinese to 
Me: An Overview of Culture and Etiquette in China​. (Vermont: Turtle Publishing), 2009, p 48. 
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franchise called Johnny’s Fried Chicken, which has locations all throughout Metro 
Manila. He was one of two siblings that attended this Filipino-Chinese Catholic School, 
including my aunt, Amelia Cotangco, who was the eldest female sibling whom I will 
refer to as Tita Mely. She went on to get her undergraduate degree at the University of 
the Philippines and fulfilled her career aspirations to be the Justice in the Court of Tax 
Appeals in Manila. Luckily, I was also fortunate enough to interview my two cousins, 
Wilson and Eyley, who have retained the surname Wong or Huang from the Fujianese 
province that our grandfather came from. Their father, Wong Ying Hian, was the second 
son that my grandfather gave birth to with his Chinese wife in Fujian (my dad’s 
half-brother) and relocated to the Philippines, after the first son, Wong Ying Kiaw, who 
relocated to Malaysia. This pair of siblings were two of my five cousins from who 
originated from my grandfather’s Chinese family who retained our traditional family 
name ​Huang​ in Fujian or ​Wong​ in Hong Kong. Eyley is the eldest of the Wong siblings, 
and moved to the Philippines at a young age. She attended the same Filipino-Chinese 
school that my father and the younger of the siblings attended, Grace Christian. Wilson 
currently resides in Australia, but relocated from Fujian to Manila to live with my father 
and his siblings. These complex relationships have often been overlooked because of the 
strong sense of familial value that the Filipino community has. Figure 2.1 (below) 
provides a clear visual of my family tree in order to provide a better understanding of the 
example relationships and experiences provided.  
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Figure 2.1 
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Growing up, I was told that my dad’s neighbors and family friends were to be 
called ​Tito​ or ​Tita,​ the Tagalog word for uncle or aunt, because neighbors and family 
friends were to be treated with the same respect and value as a family member, regardless 
of their blood relation. Whether this was a Filipino trait or not, my grandfather adopted 
this method of creating close connections very quickly upon arriving in the Philippines. 
He sent my eldest aunt and uncle, Tita Mely and Papa Johnny to live at a host family’s 
home during their time attending Crusaders-Lorenzo Ruiz Academy in the city of Manila. 
The family they stayed at was a Fujianese family that was informally indebted to my 
grandfather, allowing my aunt and uncle to live there during six days of the week to 
prevent the long commute from our familial home in the province of Marikina to Manila. 
This exemplifies the extension of my grandfather’s ​guanxi​ network and likeability, 
permeating from his individual experiences to his reputation of being a prominent 
businessman constantly looking to help others. In my interview with my Tita Mely, she 
conveyed her resentful sentiments growing up, “laging tumatakbo ako, sa Linggo ako ay 
magmadali upang mahuli ang bus sa Marikina.”  Reiterated in translation, she 62
emphasized how Sundays were important days for family gathering after Church. Her 
words also spoke of a time when she had to run to catch the bus from school in the city to 
the family home in Marikina for the afternoon, then hurry back for a quick turnaround in 
preparation for school the next morning. Although in the moment, she was resentful 
towards her parents for sending her to a school in the city, disallowing her from living at 
62 Amelia Manalastas, Interview by Teeana Cotangco, Oral Interview, Philippines, March 22, 
2019.  
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home where her siblings and friends lived, she harbored no hard feelings for being 
engulfed in Chinese culture. This unique experience of living with a host family forced 
my aunt and uncle to solely speak Hokkien in the household and at school, as well as 
form a unique bond with this Chinese family who my grandfather was very close with. 
Incorporating the multiple perspectives and experiences of my family members in the 
Philippines, I was able to broaden my scope aside from the historical texts and factual 
background of my research. In doing so, I gained a better understanding of the 
uniqueness of the Cotangco family’s experience, but also found that this dual 
Chinese-Filipino life was not uncommon. This prevalent notion of hybrid identity as a 
result of the centuries of globalization and transcultural exposure in the Philippines 
resonates not only with my own experience creating a “third space” identifying as a 
first-generation Filipino-American, but with many other ethnically Chinese individuals 
throughout the diaspora.  
 
Although “Chinese ​mestizos​ (to use the Philippine term for persons of mixed 
Chinese-native ancestry) have not been formally and legally recognized as a separate 
group — one whose membership is strictly defined by genealogical considerations rather 
than by place of birth,” these individuals play an essential role in not only Filipino 
society, but also in the economy.  A similar trend with regards to identity and sentiments 63
of “separateness” have been documented in Richard Chu’s ​Chinese & Chinese Mestizos 
63 Edgar Wickberg, “The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History,” ​Journal of Southeast Asian 
History,​ Vol. 5, No.  1 (Cambridge University Press, 1964), 62.  
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of Manila​ book which was published in 2010, where he introduces the Chinese mestizo 
experience that was determined upon the father or husband’s ethnic classification.  This 64
systematic classification of Chinese mestizo or Sangley identity harbored these 
anti-Chinese sentiments or anti-Sinicism originated in the Western world. These 
distinctions have formed the “nation-based approach to the study of ethnic identities, an 
approach that is often couched in exclusionary-inclusionary, binarist, or either-or terms” 
that will be addressed in this chapter.  65
 
The distinct racial and ethnic divide between Chinese immigrants and the 
Filipinos today have been derived from various different factors that I aim to simplify in 
this chapter. Segregation of these Chinese immigrants from Fujian was initially due to 
religious incentives and colonization, economic opportunity, and familial ties that further 
led to a noticeable “otherness” among the local Chinese-Filipino communities. Whether 
this be assessed through the conformity to the Spanish Christian religious beliefs, or the 
ambivalence towards assimilating to this religious culture, this formulation of social 
norms created a distinct notion of the majority versus the “other” minority which 
sanctioned potential discrimination towards Chinese in the Philippines. Incorporating the 
various influences in effect when defining the fluid relationship that arises when 
identifying as Chinese in the Philippines, this section unpacks the complex relationships 
between Chinese merchants and their families in both China and the Philippines. Through 
64 Richard Chu, “Chapter 6. Rethinking The Chinese Mestizos and Mestizas of Manila.” ​Chinese 
and Chinese Mestizos of Manila​, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010): 254. 
65 Ibid., p. 254.  
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use of primary sources among interviews with family members in the Philippines who 
identify as Chinese-Filipino, as well as dissection of texts this section aims to begin to 
clarify the ambiguity that accompanies the complex nature of being Chinese-Filipino 
today.  
 
Among the growing Chinese population in the Philippines, the three major 
influences on the Fujianese diaspora involve history of colonization, merging of customs 
and practices, and Western hegemony. Specifically, the longstanding history of Fujianese 
merchants in the Spanish Philippines during the 16th century led to the intermingling of 
customs and practices that resulted in the unique identity of Chinese-Filipino individuals. 
During the early 20th century specifically, aspects of colonization and Western 
hegemony have always played an essential role in the background formation of identity 
in the Philippines, whether under Spanish colonial rule or under the influence of the 
United States of America after World War II. These influences on the Fujianese diaspora 
in the Philippines had a significant effect on the Chinese-Filipino individuals’ 
experiences, forming clashing nationalistic identities and a sense of pride in the 
“otherness.” This chapter accounts for the narrative of Chinese history throughout the 
Philippines through the events of Spanish colonization, Chinese nationalism, Filipino 
nationalism, and finally Western colonization.  
 
Parián Paradise: Chinese Identity in Spanish Philippines 
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The physical segregatory sentiments originated from Chinatowns across the globe 
that represent the cultural persistence and versatility that Overseas Chinese foster. Like 
the rising presence of the Fujianese merchants in the Spanish colonial Philippines, these 
culturally specific districts represent the long standing history of Chinese migration to an 
area with very little Chinese population. These developments allow for a mutually 
beneficial relationship between the migrant communities and the host country, 
specifically the Fujianese merchant migrants in the early 16th and 17th century Spanish 
Philippines. Although most major cities in the developed countries around the world have 
a Chinatown, Binondo in Manila holds the title of the oldest and first Chinatown in the 
world.  As early as the 1570s, merchants from Fujian Province claimed to have struck 66
gold by discovering the New World in the island of Luzon.  As a location, Binondo was 67
ideal for “wholesale and retail trading for commodities” because of its proximity to major 
ports and harbors, fostering maritime trade and growing population of Fujianese 
immigrants.  Though these merchants did not quite literally find gold in the Philippines, 68
they were able to find a steady supply of silver. These Fujianese traders were present in 
the Philippines long before the establishment of an official Chinatown, “it was after the 
founding of Manila by the Spaniards in 1571 that the city became the single largest 
foreign port for Chinese goods for the next two centuries and ​the​ place from which New 
66 Soriano, “Binondo: The Oldest Chinatown.” 
67 Ryan Dominic Crewe, “Pacific Purgatory: Spanish Dominicans, Chinese Sangleys, and the 
Entanglement of Mission and Commerce in Manila, 1580-1620,” ​Journal of Early Modern 
History,​ 19 (2015): 345. 
68 Soriano, “Binondo: The Oldest Chinatown.” 
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World silver flowed into China via the galleon trade.”  Not only did the emergence of 69
silver attract these Fujianese travelers, but the potential for social mobility and a better 
life further enhanced the growth of trade relations between China and the Philippines. 
 
Incentivized by the economic profit and trade opportunity, these Fujianese 
merchants seized the sudden uprise of potential that presented itself in Manila.  Due to 70
the timing of economic events in China, these Fujianese migrants were no strangers to the 
Philippines even before the documentation of their migration in the 16th century. Trade 
routes had been established “either directly across the Pacific in the Manila galleons or 
indirectly via Europe and its trading links with Asia.”  Though the initial population of 71
Fujianese migrants in the Philippines tended to be low income individuals in search for 
better opportunities, the “Spanish conquest of Manila occurred at an opportune time in 
China. The changing economic conditions in China began to sway imperial policy back 
in Fujian’s favor. A monetary crisis due to overprinting paper money led to the 
government to require that all tax payments be made in silver, which was scarce and 
highly valued.”  This increasing demand for silver caused the Fujianese population in 72
the Philippines to skyrocket due to the large outflow of merchants that were highly active 
in the silver trade. “In the Philippines, the Chinese population grew from about 40 in 
69 Lucille Chia, “The Butcher, the Baker, and the Carpenter: Chinese Sojourners in the Spanish 
Philippines and Their Impact on Southern Fujian,” ​Journal of the Economic and Social History of 
the Orient,​ Vol. 49, No. 4 (2006): 514. 
70 Crewe, “Pacific Purgatory,” 345. 
71 Brian Moloughney, “Silver, State, and Society: A Monetary Perspective on China’s 
Seventeenth Century Crisis,” (Master’s Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1986) 51.  
72 Crewe, “Pacific Purgatory,” 345. 
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1570 to more than 15,000 by 1600 and each year large numbers of merchants sailed from 
the ports of Fujian and Guangdong to trade in Manila.”  The Fujianese merchants and 73
businessmen were an essential spark plug to the Spanish Philippines’ economy. As a 
vehicle for linking together both the Chinese and Philippine economy, these Chinese 
migrants contributed to the joint dependence and collaboration between the two countries 
by occupying this unique “third space.” Especially “after the Spanish colonial 
government established the Manila-Acapulco galleon trade system in 1571, the Chinese 
found a ‘niche’ in the Spanish colonial economy.”  This Chinese niche that heavily 74
sought after silver supply, further enhanced the economic activity of the Spanish 
Philippines. Although the Fujianese presence was not uncommon in Manila, “the Spanish 
conquest and the silver-laden galleons that followed, opened up a transpacific economy 
with unprecedented opportunities.”  Particularly during a period of time where silver 75
was extremely valuable to these Chinese migrants, the Fujianese merchants would 
purchase silks, cottons and ceramics, had the intention of exporting these goods in 
exchange for foreign silver.  Not only did this alteration incentivized Fujianese 76
merchants to participate in the silver galleon trade affect the Spanish Philippines, but it 
also had an effect on trade around the world. During the 16th century, “the Chinese 
demand for silver is what elevated the value of the commodity and provided the impetus 
73 Moloughney, “Silver, State, and Society,” p. 62.  
74 Richard Chu, “Chapter 2. The Chinese in Late Spanish Colonial Manila: An Overview,” 
Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of Manila​, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010): 54. 
75 Crewe, “Pacific Purgatory,” 345.  
76 Moloughney, “Silver, State, and Society,” p. 93.  
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for trade around the globe."  The foundation for this important Pacific trade relationship 77
between Spain’s American colonies and China through the Philippines was implemented 
as early as in “1564 when a Spanish fleet under the command of Miguel Lopez de 
Legaspi sailed across the central Pacific from New Spain,” giving life to the transpacific 
trade between the Spanish and the Philippines, also providing a source of silver for the 
Chinese.  Shifting the global economy, Fujianese migrants sparkplugged the budding 78
seeds of globalization in the Philippines. Although the Chinese were a seemingly 
beneficial economic asset to the Philippines, lingering sentiments of otherness and 
separateness were still apparent in the Philippines. The additional factor of religion 
among these Chinese merchants further enhanced the mixed treatment among Filipinos 
and Chinese-Filipinos.  
 
There was not only an exchange of goods like silver between the Chinese-Filipino 
individuals and Dominican missionaries in the Spanish Philippines, but also a priority 
towards the exchange of new religious beliefs. Like that of the profit-bearing travelers 
and traders, Dominican friars aimed to spread and expand Christianity to Asia and China 
by passing through the Philippines.  Specifically “in Manila, the Dominicans hoped to 79
unlock that door by engaging and growing an economically vital community of Chinese 
merchants and migrants from the nearby Fujian Province. The Spaniards called them 
77 Katharine Bjork, “The Link that Kept the Philippines Spanish: Mexican Merchant Interests and 
the Manila Trade,” ​Journal of World History ​Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998): 31. 
78 Moloughney, “Silver, State, and Society,” p. 61.  
79 Crewe, “Pacific Purgatory,” 338. 
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Sangleys, after the Hokkien ​sing-li​, meaning ‘trade’ or ‘doing business.’”  This newly 80
formed labeling of these Chinese-Filipino individuals was a common theme of Chinese 
relations in the Philippines, forming a sense of “otherness” and awareness of the Chinese 
“differentness” from the ideal Filipino locals. Because of the Spaniards in Manila 
fostered sentiments of “fear and distrust of the Chinese as a result of their historical 
experiences with non-Spanish and non-Christian peoples in the Iberian peninsula… 
Non-Christian Chinese were either deported or restricted in their movements and 
interaction with the locals.”  In 1594, the Spanish government took action to the rise in 81
population of non-Christian Sangleys, creating a segregated community specifically for 
the Chinese immigrant population to trade. Between the walls of the Manila Cathedral 
and the doors of Santo Domingo Church, the market space and Chinese living quarters 
were referred to as the Parián. ​ These Sangley quarters in the Chinese Parián of Manila 82
for non-Christian Chinese in compliance to the Dominican mission, fostered the growing 
transpacific trade and relationship between the Spanish and Sangleys in the Philippines.  83
The physical barrier formation segregating these non-Christian Chinese from “other” 
conforming figures. This allowed negative sentiments to resonate among the Spanish 
Christian authorities in power with any sort of intermingling between these rebellious 
non-Christian Chinese individuals. In this way, the Parián was a district that fostered the 
mutually beneficial relationship between the Sangleys and the Dominican missionaries 
80 Crewe, “Pacific Purgatory,” 339. 
81 Chu, “The Chinese in the Late Spanish Colonial Manila,” 55. 
82 Soriano, “Binondo: The Oldest Chinatown.” 
83 Crewe, “Pacific Purgatory,” 339. 
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providing the Chinese with a government recognized commonplace while providing the 
potential to achieve the Dominicans’ “ultimate goal… to ‘seek martyrdom among the 
Chinese’ in China.”  Although those Christian Chinese in Binondo were treated with 84
more respect than the non-Christians who resided in the Parián, these Chinese individuals 
were still essential to the Spaniards in bridging the gap between the Philippines and Asia. 
According to ethnographer and intercultural author, Juliet Uytanlet, “the Chinese success 
and constant increase in population caused alarm among the Spaniards that led to a 
number of massacres and the destruction of the Chinese settlements.”  The missionaries 85
aimed to utilize the Parián district as a method to trace the Chinese networks back to 
mainland China in order to achieve their goal of spreading Christianity to broader Asia. 
In response, the non-Christian Chinese members in the Parián tended to convert to 
Christianity out of convenience, “choos[ing] to be baptized only because the State and the 
Catholic Church granted more rights and benefits to converts. After having been 
converted, however, they returned to their ‘pagan’ ways.”  This unique relationship that 86
the non-Christian Chinese individuals had with the Spaniards and local Filipinos formed 
a sense of “otherness” among the Chinese in the Parián.  
 
84 Crewe, “Pacific Purgatory,” 339. 
85  Juliet Lee Uytanlet, “The Hybrid Tsinoys: Challenges of Hybridity and Homogeneity as 
Sociocultural Constructs among the Chinese in the Philippines,” Pickwick Publications, (2016): 
p. 39. 
86 Richard Chu, “The ‘Chinese’ and the ‘Mestizos’ of the Philippines: Towards a New 
Interpretation,” ​Philippine Studies​, Vol. 50, No. 3, (2003): 337.  
Cotangco 
40 
  
 
Contributing to the complex relationship formation among the Spanish authorities 
and the Sangleys, the Parián was an essential location “full of blurred visions, awkward 
translations, and tricksters.”  Essential because of its capacity to host an amalgamation 87
of multiple cultures, among Dominican Spaniards, local Tagalog-speaking Filipinos, and 
Fujianese merchants from China. This symbiotic relationship formed as “the Spanish 
began very quickly to rely on the Sangleyes, not only for goods from China, but for all 
kinds of services in their colony. All the craftsmen, storekeepers, unskilled laborers, and 
most farmers, fisherman, and domestic servants were Chinese.  The keystone district of 88
the Parián was crucial in forming the transpacific relations between Asia and America, 
straddling the line “between missions and commerce, the story of the Sangley-Spanish 
encounter in the Parián reveals global and transoceanic forces that were contingent on 
local interactions.”  The combination of these Spanish missionaries as well as the rise in 89
demand for silver, silks, sugar, and other luxury goods hand in hand with a monetary 
perspective, created an opportune time for Fujianese populations to rise in the Spanish 
Philippines. The rise in population of the Chinese posed a potential threat to the masses in 
the Philippines which led to the inherent societal segregation. This rise in population 
implied a rise in power which cultivated “resentment and restrictions towards the Chinese 
[which] resulted in their segregation and concentration in Binondo, population control for 
centuries, and inevitably, the development and encouragement of the vocation of trade 
87 Crewe, “Pacific Purgatory,” 341. 
88 Chia, The Butcher, the Baker, and the Carpenter: Chinese Sojourners in the Spanish Philippines 
and Their Impact on Southern Fujian,” p. 515. 
89 Crewe, “Pacific Purgatory,” 340. 
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that reinforced the stereotypes.”  These sentiments of segregation, isolation, and 90
discrimination carried on further during the gradual formation of Filipino identity 
throughout the 20th century.  
 
Opportunities Sprouting from Prejudice and “Otherness” 
The complex relationship formed by the creation of a physically segregated 
community for non-Christian Chinese Sangleys in the Spanish Philippines was not 
always symbiotic and civil. This distinct sense of “otherness” admitted to the Sangleys by 
the formation of the Parián from the culturally normative attitudes adopted by the 
Spanish, fostered attitudes of discrimination by nature. By the early nineteenth century, 
the Hokkien term, Sangley, slowly transitioned into the term “Chino” or “Tsinoy” which 
was derived by the Chinese population becoming more diverse and “identified more as 
nationals of China than Chinese merchants.”  Throughout the nineteenth century, the 91
social structure in the Philippines had altered dramatically. With the transition from the 
barangay​ or ​barrio​ framework where groupings or municipalities were separated by 
regions that allowed for easier ruling of small communities, to classes segregated by 
racial background. Of these social classes, the Chinese were placed at the lowest tier in 
society.  The Spaniards successfully segregated and isolated the pure Chinese from the 92
pure Filipinos, but failed at spreading Christianity and assimilating them into the Spanish 
90  Juliet Lee Uytanlet, “The Hybrid Tsinoys,” (2016) 39. 
91 Ibid., p. 39. 
92 Ibid., p. 40.  
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community.  This fostered a sense of “Chineseness of the Chinese people, uniting them 93
as one in times of crisis and trouble” which further raised a sense of nationalism among 
Chinese-Filipinos in the Philippines.  
 
On the topic of embracing “Chineseness” and the Chinese-Filipino identity, I 
asked my aunt, Tita Mely, if she had experienced attitudes of prejudice or discrimination 
regarding her identity as Chinese-Filipino. Straddling the line between being “seen as too 
Filipino in school, but also 'intsik beho' on the streets,” as she mentioned the derogatory 
connotations behind the names uttered towards her during her childhood.  The term 94
“intsik beho” was coined during a time when the Chinese Filipinos were discriminated by 
both the Filipinos and the Spanish communities in the Philippines, whereas “intsik” was a 
negative term used to describe the Chinese associated with eating congee, while “beho” 
was an alteration of the term “viejo” meaning “old” in Spanish. Although these pejorative 
connotations associated with the term “intsik beho” and being called “Intsik” are used to 
denote and categorize Chinese in the Philippines, the term is a form of the hybridized 
cultural formation emerging from the aspects of globalization and transcultural 
integration. 
 
The close association with their homeland ties and family values distinguished the 
Chinese-Filipino individuals from those of pure Filipino background. My aunt spoke 
93 Ibid., p.41.  
94 Amelia Manalastas, Interview by Teeana Cotangco. Oral Interview. Philippines, March 22, 
2019.  
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about her childhood weeknights that were spent at her host family’s home, where her and 
my uncle’s busy schedules only allowed them to return home to Marikina, a city East of 
Manila, on Sundays for a couple of hours. My uncle, Papa Johnny or Juanito, mentioned 
the term “tsekwa” or “chekwa”  which is also a derogatory term that was used to tease 95
and make fun of the Chinese, while the Chinese would call the Filipinos, ​hoan-á,​ which 
means foreigner or barbarian in Hokkien.  ​Similarly, my dad and his younger brother 96
who attended Grace Christian, a Chinese Christian School in Quezon City, spoke of his 
experience riding the bus to and from school. He vividly remembered having to roll up 
the windows when passing by the low-life cigarette vendors who gathered at the street 
corners, swarming the bus to tease and ​batok ​(the Tagalog word for smack) him and the 
other children on the back of their heads. On the bus, they would generally be called 
“chinks” and hear “​intsik beho kain lugaw​” (congee eaters who were weak in the knees) 
which were intended to insult him and the other children for their Chinese background. 
These low-income individuals on the streets were typically uneducated and ignorant, 
“they teased us because we were different.”  Although there were different motivations 97
and incentives behind the emotions towards Chinese-Filipino relations, attitudes of 
national pride and heritage became the norm.  
 
95 ​This term originated from a combination of the Philippine Hokkien saying “Intsik gwakang” or 
in chek/chiak, góa kang​ [ 叔,我工] meaning his or her uncle that was later morphed and 
shortened to tsekwa or chekwa. 
96 Juanito Cotangco, Interview by Teeana Cotangco. Oral Interview. Philippines, March 20, 2019 
97 Edilberto Cotangco. Interview by Teeana Cotangco. Oral Interview. Philippines, March 18, 
2019.  
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Individuals interviewed in Juliet Uytanlet’s book, ​The Hybrid Tsinoys​, shared 
related experiences when asked questions regarding their identification as Chinese in the 
Philippines. Chris,  a first generation Chinese mestizo who also attended Chinese school, 
mentioned that “what [he] liked about Chinese is that if they know you  are Chinese, they 
will accept you. Similarly, what [he] does not like is that if they learn you are ​hoan-á, yun 
na​ negative ​na​ (they already have negative responses).”  Depending on who asks, the 98
levels of prejudice will be judged accordingly and affects the illicit response. Alternately, 
my cousin Wilson, mentioned that he did not experience harsh mistreatment, because 
“most of the Chinese were financially capable in comparison to the common Filipinos.”  99
He went on to point out that as long as you were civil, minded one's own business, and 
did your job, not showing off too much to inhibit sentiments of jealousy or bad attitudes, 
no harsh attitudes from the local Filipinos. These varying perspectives regarding identity 
as mixed-race Chinese-Filipino in the Philippines show the generations of progress and 
adaptations that have transformed since the 16th century.  
 
These “cultural notions of nation-based identities” accompanied by the rise of 
Chinese nationalism and Filipino nationalism accompanied the trends in familial 
practices of Chinese merchant families during the early twentieth century. Corresponding 
with the historic rise in nationalism in China, the older generations of Chinese (those 
born in the 1920’s and 1930’s) in the Philippines “still [felt] strongly attached to China 
98 Chris, CM individual. Interviewed by Juliet Lee Uytanlet. “The Hybrid Tsinoys,” 22 July 2012.  
99 Wilson Valdez. Interview by Teeana Cotangco. Oral Interview. Philippines, March 22, 2019. 
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are products of the rise of nationalism in China and the Philippines.”  This sense of 100
pride in “Chineseness” can be traced throughout my grandfather’s experience, who was 
born in Fujian in 1913 and migrated to the Philippines in 1939. After getting married into 
a poor and hard situation in Fujian at the age of 18, my grandfather sought a method of 
migration to the Philippines. His brother-in-law was a General in the Chinese army, but 
was based in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation in the 50s, and assisted in 
foraging a fake birth certificate and accompanying documents to stay in the Philippines. 
This was the birth of the local name “Amando Cotangco” which he later used to start his 
family in the Philippines, after marrying my grandmother, Angelina Reyes, a 
Filipino-born with distant Spanish heritage. My grandfather first worked in a restaurant in 
Pasig, then moved on to open up a grocery store which later closed down. Eventually, he 
had formed enough connections and earned enough money to open up a “bigasan” or rice 
retailing business, which was a popular business in Marikina,that he settled in. Together 
with his brother, Eng, my grandfather opened a shoe last factory called “Modern Heel” 
which later sprouted into a leather shoe factory. Along with some of the unique themes 
and traditions adopted by Chinese merchants living in the Philippines, came the practice 
of having multiple wives, one in mainland China and one in the Philippines. The Chinese 
practice of having “concubines” became culturally specific when these individuals 
resided in the Philippines. In practice, the Chinese merchants in the Philippines “who 
took in Filipino ‘concubines,’ or ‘secondary  wives,’ their Chinese wives and families 
condoned this practice as long as ‘proper priority’ was given them, in that the union with 
100 Chu, “The ‘Chinese’ and the ‘Mestizos’ of the Philippines,” 354.  
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the Filipino ‘wives’ occured after the marriage in China.”  In a similar vein, my 101
grandfather had a wife and two children in Fujian, prior to migrating to the Philippines in 
search of better opportunities.   The dual marriage practices were common among many 102
of the rich Chinese merchants who spent their time in both China and the Philippines.  103
Asking around among my cousins and uncles, there was little questions asked towards 
my grandfather’s decision to live a dual life, fostering two families and maintaining 
relationships with all of his sons and daughters. When directly addressing this concept of 
dual family practice with family members, they casually overlooked it, taking a positive 
outlook regarding the beneficial result of having a larger family. These sentiments geared 
towards appreciating familial values are deeply ingrained in both Chinese and Filipino 
culture. Although after “the height of Chinese nationalism in the Philippines in the 1930s, 
unions with Filipinas, whether legal or otherwise, began to be perceived ‘as a threat to the 
existence of the Chinese community by racial dilution and acculturation.’”  This 104
reiterates the notion of “otherness” and emerges from the transcultural hybridity and the 
“third space” that straddles the line between acknowledging tradition and maneuvering a 
new sphere.  
 
101 Richard Chu, “Chapter 8, Chinese Merchant Families: Family, Identity, and Culture in the 
Early Twentieth Century,” p. 336. 
102 Juanito Cotangco, Interviewed by Teeana Cotangco, Oral Interview, Philippines, March 20, 
2019. 
103 Richard Chu, “Chapter 9, Negotiating Identities Within Chinese Merchant Families:  To Be 
‘Filipino’ or To Be ‘Chinese,’” ​Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of Manila,​ 377. 
104 Chu, “Chapter 8,” 336.  
Cotangco 
47 
  
 
The unique cultural characteristics that the Chinese mestizos harbored have been 
driven by discrimination, segregation, and colonization. Although the derogatory terms 
and ambivalence towards identifying as “Chinese” dependent upon who inquires, this 
dual identity shines through as beneficial. The sentiments of “nationalism swept the 
country, the Chinese acknowledged their gratitude to the Philippines for giving them a 
place for refuge by calling themselves Filipino-Chinese.”  Through compiling 105
information from family members as well as secondary sources, I have been able to 
dissect the progressive but hybrid nature that comes along with approaching what it 
means to identify as Chinese-Filipino. In this way, globalization contrasts tradition in the 
expansive and inclusive nature that encompasses the dichotomy and duality of the birth 
of a hybrid “third culture.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 Uytanlet, “The Hybrid Tsinoys,” p. 191. 
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Chapter 3: Big Mac in a Small World 
“About four-fifths of the world's population, most of whom live in what is 
commonly called the Third World, have had their lives shaped by the experience of 
colonialism. However, global-impacting developments beginning with the end of the 
1980s, and the whole phenomenon of globalization have contributed to a more dynamic 
foregrounding of postcolonialism. ”  Directly correlating to the Spanish colonial era in 106
the Philippines and how Fujianese individuals belong, Michaela Wolf’s perspective on 
globalization as a “dynamic foreground” ties together the universal effect that comes 
hand in hand with cultural formation in the “third space.” The progression of the cultural 
formation that links the Fujianese migratory patterns with the hybridized cultural nuances 
of Filipino-Chinese identity in a globalized postcolonial context. Through a brief 
introduction of George Ritzer’s term, ​McDonaldization​, I will provide a foundational 
background on the progress of globalization and the effect on hybridity among cultures. 
The negotiation of national identity as well as unification under a common theme results 
in the formation of a “third space” and the acknowledgment of multiple cultures. Through 
the constantly progressing lens of cultural globalization, hybridization allows for the 
formation of a new type of culture, individually driven by local and foreign forces.  As 107
a result of both colonization and the rise in capitalism throughout the global economy, 
hybridity among cultures and the formation of this “third space” has become an 
106 ​Michaela Wolf, "The Third Space in Postcolonial Representation," ​Changing the Terms, 
University of Ottowa Press: 2000, p. 128. 
107 Dal Yong Jin, “The Rise of the New Korean Wave,” ​New Korean Wave: Transnational 
Cultural Power in the Age of Social Media,​ University of Illinois Press, (2016): p 9. 
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increasingly common phenomenon around the world. Especially during the Internet era 
of the twenty-first century, information and communication is easily and readily available 
and intercultural exchange is not an uncommon phenomenon.  
 
Through the lens of cultural globalization, hybridization creates a new type of 
culture driven by local and foreign forces. Particularly after a transitional era in China, 
from a socialist to market-based economy, it is important to evaluate the prevalence of 
outside forces on the progress of the formation of a new identity among the Fujianese 
diaspora. With regards to Fujianese merchant out-migration and the unique ambiguity of 
the Filipino-Chinese identity, a proper understanding of hybridity in a global sense serves 
as a tool to understand the fluid and continuous definition of the third space in cultural 
formation. Is there something lost from a culture’s authenticity when foreign elements are 
introduced? At what point does a cultural hybrid become identified as a core culture 
rather than a cultural mixture?  
 
The rise in phenomenon of ​McDonaldization,​ introduced by George Ritzer, an 
American sociologist, professor, and author who studies globalization and social theory, 
allows for further analysis of the larger implications of globalization. In the framework of 
my argument, McDonaldization is an example of the progressing nature of globalization 
under the broader significance of capitalism. Commonly known as: Mickey D’s, Golden 
Arches, Mak Kee, Makku, or McDick’s, these are all shorthand variations and/or slang 
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for McDonald’s, one of the most recognizable fast-food chains across the globe.  108
However, this chapter is not about the fast-food industry or the commercialization of the 
famous clown, Ronald McDonald, alternatively I will be assessing how McDonald’s food 
chain acts as a global phenomenon and how it serves as the quintessential example of 
globalization’s range, particularly in the postcolonial era of social media. In this sense, 
this route of globalization can be seen through the capitalistic contemporary lens with the 
presence of McDonald’s as a large chain existing in multiple spheres throughout the 
world. In tangent with a rapidly modernizing world, McDonald’s has been able to expand 
their brand on a global sphere, asserting its dominance in the fast food industry. An 
example of the influential effect that McDonald’s has on a global sphere is presented in 
the September 1986 edition of ​The Economist​, a prestigious magazine publication, which 
released the first annual “Big Mac Index” as a part of “burgernomics” indicating the 
purchasing power of currencies around the world in relation to the local price of the Big 
Mac.  This index represents the importance of McDonald’s global presence, particularly 109
during a time of rising commercialization and an increasing rise in consumption, 
specifically, the fast food industry. The “trend of growing worldwide interconnectedness 
has been accompanied by several clashing notions of cultural difference” that makeup 
globalization​.  Especially during a time when social media allows for easily accessible 110
108 Alex Frank, “What McDonald’s Is Nicknamed Around the World,” spoonuniversity.com, 
https://spoonuniversity.com/lifestyle/mcdonalds-nicknames-around-the-world 
109 George Ritzer, “An Introduction to McDonaldization,” ​The McDonaldization of Society​, Pine 
Forge Press 1993, 11. 
110 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” ​International Sociology​, Vol. 9, No. 
2, (Rowman & Littlefield, June 1994): p. 41. 
Cotangco 
51 
  
 
interconnectedness and collaboration among cultures, acknowledgement of cultural and 
national differences is extremely essential. For example, although the “Big Mac Index” 
implies that there is consistency throughout all McDonald’s branches throughout the 
world, McDonald’s in China has experienced an extremely rapid approach to expansion 
than that of McDonald’s in America.  
 
McDonaldization theory acknowledges the homogenization of societies during an 
era of rising capitalism and rapid modernization. This example demonstrates the varying 
positionality of globalization as “a form of intercultural hybridization, partly in its origins 
and certainly in its present globally localizing variety of forms.”  McDonaldization 111
alludes to some aspects of global implications that arise in tangent to the United States 
and the rise of consumption. Globalization is commonly interpreted as a standardization 
or “cultural synchronization” that is further tied with modernity.  Alternately, 112
globalization theories can be classified to varying degrees depending on the basis of their 
emphasis on the duality that the globalization of culture provides. These differing 
viewpoints expose two clashing extremes that pose both an optimistic view adhering 
towards hybridity and the creation of a new “third space” as well as a realistic perspective 
underscoring the blatant deletion of original cultures. According to Homi Bhabha, “the 
Third Space ‘carries the burden of the meaning of culture.’”  He defines this space as 113
existing in between “former fixed territories that the whole body of resistant 
111 Ibid., p. 55.  
112 Ibid., p. 67. 
113 ​Wolf, "The Third Space in Postcolonial Representation," p. ​135. 
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hybridization comes into being in the form of fragile syncretisms, contrapuntal 
recombinations and acculturation.”   The Chinese-Filipino identity as hybrid, rather 114
than a deletion of one culture in priority over another, is an example of the collaboration 
involved in the formation of Bhabha’s “third space.” Ranging from the understanding 
that the world is becoming a more uniform and standardized to recognizing the 
contextualization of cultural background and history, “globalization of culture can lead 
either to a trend toward common codes and practices (homogeneity) or to a situation in 
which many cultures interact to create a kind of pastiche or a blend leading to a variety of 
hybrids (heterogeneity).”  The understanding that the world is becoming increasingly 115
more uniform and standardized through means of modernization extends an optimistic 
perspective towards hybridization of cultures in a global context. Michaela Wolf 
interprets Homi Bhabha’s analysis of hybridity as “not simply a third term that resolves 
the tension between two cultures in a dialectal play of ‘recognition,’ and cannot be 
discussed as an issue of cultural relativism.”  The collaboration between two cultures, in 116
this case, the Spanish colonial Philippines and Chinese migrants from Fujian, cooperate 
to form the unique and “culturally relative” identity of Chinese-Filipino.  
  
On the other hand, modernization also imposes the potential “erasing cultural and 
biological diversity in its way, and now not only the gains (rationalization, 
114  ​Ibid., p. 135. 
115 George Ritzer and Elizabeth L. Malone, “Globalization Theory: Lessons from the Exportation 
of McDonaldization and the New Means of Consumption,” ​Journal of American Studies,​ (2000), 
98. 
116 ​Wolf, "The Third Space in Postcolonial Representation," p. 134. 
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standardization, control) but also the losses (alienation, disenchantment, displacement) 
are becoming apparent.”  Albeit, “with respect to cultural forms, hybridization is [also] 117
defined as ‘the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and 
recombine with new forms in new practices.’”  The notion of separating in order to 118
successfully recombine and form anew is an fundamental aspect that comes along with 
hybrid cultural formation. The dichotomy between homogeneity and heterogeneity 
recognizes the clashing notions of cultural difference that comes hand in hand with the 
rapid process of modernization. For example, in Homi Bhabha’s work, he frames this 
process to be “​imitating an original in such a way that the priority of the original is not 
reinforced but by the very fact that it can be simulated, copied, transferred, transformed, 
made into a simulacrum and so on: the ‘original’ is never finished or complete in itself.  119
Through proper understanding of modernization, distinct from Western hegemonic and 
Eurocentric approaches, rather in a global capitalistic sense, topics of hybridity through 
the progressive lens of globalization allows for the creation of the “third space.” This 
framework allows for advances in the development of modernization, providing an 
outlook for cultures like that of Chinese individuals in the Philippines, to acknowledge 
their original heritage while combating obstacles of new cultural formation in a foreign 
sphere.  
 
117 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” 45. 
118 Ibid., p. 72. 
119 Wolf, "The Third Space in Postcolonial Representation," p. 137. 
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Uniformity at the Cost of Resistance and Depletion 
Although global homogenization adheres to recognizing cultural differences and 
aiming towards a more uniform social relations, “globalization is not an all-encompassing 
process of homogenization but a complex mixture of homogenization and 
heterogenization.”  It can be broken down to associate homogeneity to be categorized 120
under cultural imperialism and heterogeneity with localism. Often times, this conflict 
highlights implications of “otherness” that comes when cultures clash and combine. 
Similar to the Chinese mestizo experience negotiating the Philippines under Spanish 
colonialism, this formation of hybrid identity was composed through distinctive 
formation of the majority in power versus the minority other group. In this sense, 
“hybridity therefore describes a process in which the single voice of colonial authority 
undermines the operation of colonial power by inscribing and disclosing the trace of the 
other so that it reveals itself as double-voiced.”  This homogenizing form of 121
standardization or unification often disregards the localities and the indigenous cultural 
differences, often associated with cultural imperialism and the rise in the spread of 
market economy.  Separation and notions of “otherness” often lead to discrimination 122
and competition, resulting in loss of authenticity. 
 
Interestingly enough, conflict that tends to divide humanity, like conquest and 
opposition, also tend to unite humankind through antagonism and formation of a “global 
120 George Ritzer and Elizabeth L. Malone, “Globalization Theory,” 98. 
121 ​Wolf, "The Third Space in Postcolonial Representation," p. 134. 
122 Ritzer and Malone, “Globalization Theory,” 98. 
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melenge” of cultural experiences, slowly coming to formation through adaptation to other 
cultures.  The negotiation between the deletion of cultures, but also the formation and 123
evolution of a new third dimension that arises from the “divergent cultural patterns” 
allude to a “​transcultural space​.”  Although this can often lead to misinterpretations and 124
cultural divergence, this unique interpretation has come into fruition after taking into 
account histories of colonization and Western imperialism. In this sense, hybridization or 
hybridity refers to the construction of new culture that emerges from the interweaving of 
elements between the colonizers and colonized, challenging the validity of any fixed 
indigenous cultural identity.  A specific example of this combination and intercultural 125
communication is the Spanish Philippines and the formation of a ​mestizo ​identity. This 
reiterates Pieterse’s definition that “globalization taken widely, however, refers to the 
formation of a worldwide historical field and involves the development of global 
memory, arising from shared global experiences. Such shared global experiences range 
from intercivilizational encounters such as long-distance trade and migration to slavery, 
conquest, war, imperialism, colonialism.”   126
 
The Spanish Christian conquests in the Philippines and intermingling between 
Dominican friars and local indigenous Filipinos are a culmination of years of 
123 Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” 67. 
124 Britta Kalscheur, “Encounters in the Third Space: Links Between Intercultural Communication 
Theories and Postcolonial Approaches,” ​The Global Intercultural Communication Reader, 
Routledge 2014, 34. 
125 Yong, “New Korean Wave,” p. 13. 
126 Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” p. 76. 
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homogenization that creates an identity of subculture. Furthermore, Dick Hebdige’s 
conceptualization of subculture as “a form of resistance in which experienced 
contradictions and objections to this ruling ideology are obliquely represented in style” is 
useful in that it prioritizes the form of resistance to the dominant social norm.  This 127
raises the potential question of who has the authority to dictate what becomes 
standardized to be socially accepted as the “norm” when referring to the common 
practices and traditions of a culture? Authenticity is lost in the homogenization process, 
as commonly seen in Western imperialism. This theme is often translated in the 
American context where the consolidation of cultures into a melting pot of uniformity is 
normalized through pursuit of the American Dream.  
 
Salad Bowl > Melting Pot 
An important distinction must be made in clarifying the difference between 
modernity and globalization, as a result of Westernization. Although this process of 
modernity originated from Western imperialism, creating a new space while 
acknowledging “worldwide social relations,” it must be interpreted loosely as a salad 
bowl rather than a melting pot.  Avoiding the Eurocentric angle that problematizes the 128
global perspective of the formation of new cultures, the theory of a salad bowl 
emphasizes the importance of not diluting indigenous cultures, but rather highlighting 
and acknowledging authentic themes. In contrast with the more conventional “melting 
127 Roald Maliangkay, “Ch 13: The Popularity of Individualism,” ​The Korean Popular Culture 
Reader​, Duke University Press, 2014, p 306.  
128 Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” p. 71. 
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pot,” that merges and dilutes cultures, imposes marginalization and assimilation rather 
than a multicultural salad bowl that calls for integration and recognition of diverse ethnic 
backgrounds.  Particularly looking back at United States history, the idea of achieving 129
the “American Dream” favors the Western perspective of multiple cultures merging 
together to form a nationalistic melting pot of cultures that encapsulate what it means to 
be American. In contrast, Homi Bhabha’s “concept of hybridity is radically 
heterogeneous and discontinuous, a dialectical articulation that involves a new 
perspective of cultural representation.”  This approach to a hybridized society allows for 130
acceptance rather than deletion of new perspectives, highlighting the heterogeneous 
manner that Bhabha implies. With this sentiment in mind, immigrants, like Fujianese 
immigrants and merchants, assimilate into their host country’s new world culture and 
encounter obstacles to maintain their traditional cultural practices of what it means to be 
authentically Chinese. I was able to witness a result of this hybridization first-hand during 
my time in the Philippines where I attended my cousin Sherrielyn’s wedding where 
Hokkien, Tagalog, and English were all spoken.  
 
Critical theorist and scholar of hybridity and the Third Space in a postcolonial 
context, Homi Bhabha introduces the “third dimension,” negotiating the intersubjective 
realm that blurs the boundaries between intervention and insertion.  These blurred 131
129 Safi Mahmoud Mahfouz, “America’s Melting Pot or the Salad Bowl: The Stage Immigrant’s 
Dilemma,” ​Journal of Foreign Languages, Cultures & Civilizations, ​Vol. 1 No. 2, Dec 2013, p 2.  
130 ​Wolf, "The Third Space in Postcolonial Representation," p. 134. 
131 Homi Bhabha, “The Location of Culture,” Routledge 1994, 191. 
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boundaries, arise hand in hand with the observations of intercultural discourse between 
distribution of power among Western and non-Western cultures that aline with 
sentiments of Western imperialism.  In the process of new cultural formation, it is 132
important to distinguish between deletion of culture and appreciation. The progressive 
formation of Chinese-Filipino identity in a postcolonial context encompasses this notion 
of creating a “third space” identity. Jin Dal Yong (2016) mentions in his analysis of 
hybridity, “conflict, conquest, and oppression only divide people, then nations themselves 
would merely be artifacts of division for they too were mostly born out of conflict.” 
Acknowledging the theories of globalization and hybridity in a Western dominated 
sphere, this progression is  “far from giving us a universally homogenous culture, 
globalization defines a space in which the world’s cultures rub elbows and generate new, 
heterogeneous meanings and understandings.”  This comparison and development of a 133
new “third space” as a result of crossover cultures and intercultural collaboration, directly 
corresponds with the unique Chinese-Filipino identity comes into fruition, allowing for 
acknowledgement of the traditional past and a more progressive future.  
 
This negotiation of intersections between global and local forces encompass a rich 
history of colonization while acknowledging the new spaces that come into fruition to 
form the unique identity of what it means to be Filipino. These “multiple identities and 
the decentering of the social subject are grounded in the ability of individuals to avail 
132 Kalscheur, “Encounters in the Third Space,” p. 33.  
133 Ritzer et al., “Globalization Theory,” p. 104. 
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themselves of several organizational options at the same time. Thus globalization is the 
framework for the diversification and amplification of ‘sources of the self.’”  In 134
reconsidering who necessarily dictates the cultural normativity that deems itself as the 
“standard,” the true definition arises intrinsically. In this way, experiences of conflict also 
unite humankind, producing an ambivalent unity that emerges out of the ashes of 
antagonism, conflict, and oppression.  This hybrid identity has laid the foundation for 135
Filipinos around the diaspora to embrace this “third space” identity of assimilation, 
whether that be as a Fujianese merchant in the Spanish Philippines or a Chinese mestizo 
navigating the streets of postcolonial Manila. The blurred boundaries mentioned in 
Bhabha’s ​third space​ involves new forms and cultural meaning and production to occur, 
blurring the limitations of existing boundaries and calling into question the established 
classifications of culture and identity.  Although hybridization often leads to ambiguity 136
and the “in-between” identity, Bhabha points out that “hybridity needs to open up a ‘third 
space’ within which diverse elements encounter and transform… where minority 
discourses intervene to preserve their strengths and particularity.”  This complex and 137
overlapping identity is a result of the new hybridized global order. Identity formation is a 
continuous cycle and is constantly progressing as a reemerging transnational relationships 
form.  
 
 
 
134  Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” p. 76. 
135  Ibid., p. 77. 
136 Yong, “New Korean Wave,” p. 14.  
137 Bhabha, “The Location of Culture,” pp. 217-218. 
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Conclusion:  
 
Fujianese migration has been a widely discussed, largely due to the legal and 
illegal implications associated with the migration of its people. Specifically among 
Fujianese migrants in the Philippines, there are those who embody the indigenous 
Filipino culture and those who have brought a migrant culture from Fujian Province. 
With this transcultural mixing, we now have a creation of a “third space” that centers on 
both the formation of a new cultural identity while acknowledging and maintaining the 
authentic culture of their homeland. In beginning to unpack this unique circumstance, I 
interviewed family members who have directly experienced, and been affected by, this 
phenomenon of “illegal” migration from Fujian. In interviewing my family members, I 
found that they had to selectively choose when and where to appropriate the cultural 
identity they associated themselves with. Thinking about those who had migrated from 
Fujian in order to establish a new life and create new waves of cultural identity, I’m 
reminded of my time in China. 
 
During my summer abroad, studying and interning in Shanghai, I was constantly 
approached with the question: ​Nǐ shì hàn guórén ma​? [你是汉国人吗？​]​ which in 
translation means “Are you ethnically Han Chinese?” There was constant inquiry 
regarding my ethnicity and cultural background, whether it be by a range of random 
strangers on the street or by my peers. Unsure of how to respond, I answered that I was 
American, but that my parents were born and raised in the Philippines. I vividly recall the 
man who approached me on the street who was unsatisfied with my response, further 
Cotangco 
61 
  
 
questioning where my father’s father originated from. When I had finally told him that 
my grandfather migrated from Fujian, he sighed with relief and suggested that I respond 
accordingly next time, with the claim that I was indeed Han Chinese. This interaction left 
me puzzled as to why he had felt so strongly about my identity and what it meant to 
identify as ethnically Han, the largest ethnic group in China.  
 
During the years going into college, I traced my racial breakdown through my 
family tree and came to the conclusion that, yes, I am technically 33% ethnically Han 
Chinese because of my grandfather’s Fujianese roots, but I am also 33% Spanish and 
33% Filipino. Though in America, I am simply categorized under the broader term 
“Asian,” under the assumption that there are only five or six racial categories available in 
the multiple choice bubble section above “Other.” In navigating this sphere of cultural 
ambiguity that characterizes the Filipino-American identity, I was able to deeply 
self-reflect on my own personal experience, as well as mirrored experiences of 
Chinese-Filipinos throughout the diaspora. These joint experiences inspired this topic of 
research regarding cultural hybridity during a century of rapid globalization. 
 
 
What I took from my experience is that individuals around the world are 
predominantly a mixture of hybrid cultures constantly migrating and forming new spaces. 
In the creation of a “third space” it is important to acknowledge the role that snakeheads 
provided in facilitating the successful migration of culture. Snakeheads directly influence 
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cultural preservation through utilizing their intricate ​guanxi ​network of Chinese 
individuals both in Fujian and throughout the diaspora. The fundamental role of the 
snakehead, also considered a middle-man in the human smuggling process, is a keystone 
element in routes of migration and cultural formation in new spaces. In the creation of a 
new migrant identity and culture, we can’t overlook the role that the snakeheads held in 
facilitating cultural migration and the new identities that followed. From my research it’s 
clear that these well-connected individuals play an essential role in the formation of 
Chinese identities throughout the diaspora. Imperative to facilitating relationships 
between migrants and their host countries, snakeheads maintain a unique position of 
crossing the boundaries between cultures and creating a new “third space.” My 
experience in China as an individual who fits into the ambiguous “third space” of not 
directly belonging to the broader majority while adhering to a specific perceived identity 
has allowed me to negotiate this distinctive “otherness.” 
 
Addressing my identity as a Filipino-Chinese American citizen while navigating 
the new spheres provided in a culturally diverse country, I have come to acknowledge the 
nuances that come hand in hand with hybridity. Rapid globalization has formed links 
between and among cultures that further contribute to the construction of hybrid 
identities. Taking into consideration the various spheres of influence involved in this 
process, like government corruption, this proposed issue of human smuggling associated 
with the snakehead business has a global effect. In this way, Fujianese migration 
becomes a microcosm for a larger, global phenomenon. When we consider the 
Cotangco 
63 
  
 
implications of “illegal” migration and the creation of a new “third space,” we 
acknowledge the past experiences that contribute to the progressive collection of fluid 
hybrid identities. The concept of hybridity and understanding cultural differences is 
essential and transcultural links continue to grow and progress. This pressing and relevant 
topic regarding the various routes hybridity takes is apparent, particularly in 
Filipino-Chinese identities like my own.  
 
In speaking with locals in Shanghai, particularly the man who assigned me the 
identity that I ​should ​claim while in China, I learned the importance in focusing on 
oneness rather than distinctions of “otherness.” I became privy to the intricacies involved 
in recognizing the fluid and ambiguous nature that comes with identity. Although there 
are various factors that come into play when combating identity, the multiplicity of 
cultural borders are a permanent feature of contemporary societies. Transcultural links 
have played an integral role in the postcolonial twenty first century and continue to 
establish the narratives of hybrid individuals. In my final interviews with my family 
members, the development was made that “Filipinos are survivors. We are able to adapt 
and thrive [to the environment] wherever we end up at. Filipinos are more focused on 
being able to do well and succeed rather than be restricted to identifying with ethnicity.”
  138
 
138 Edilberto Cotangco, Interviewed by Teeana Cotangco, Oral Interview, America, April 10, 
2019. 
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After speaking with my father and reflecting on his words, it reminded me of my 
transition into college. When I first came to Claremont McKenna College, I had to 
grapple with who I knew myself to be and who CMC thought I was. In recognizing this 
moment of uncertain identity, I found myself conforming to the preconceived notions of 
the CMC identity, whether that be in the classroom, on the basketball court, or in the 
everyday social scene. In navigating this gray in-between “space” of identity formation, I 
started to make decisions for myself in order to “do well” in my own areas of expertise 
instead of adhering to a predescribed identity that was not necessarily me. In doing so, I 
was able to examine and recognize the beauty in the growth. Looking progressively 
towards the future, I was able to appreciate the identity assigned to me in this new space 
while acknowledging the authenticities of my old perceived identity, in order to create an 
identity of my own in this “third space.” I can see now how the formation of cultural 
hybridity is not unique to my own experience, instead, it reveals an experience had by all, 
and too, recognizes the permanence that cultural hybridity has on a global level.  
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